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I.

Introduction
Child care subsidies are an important policy instrument to facilitate the transition of welfare recipients into employment by defraying the expenses associated with child care. Indeed, several studies show that the cost of child care is an important constraint to helping disadvantaged mothers find employment (Kimmel, 1998; Anderson & Levine, 2000; Han & Walfdogel, 2001; Blau & Robins, 1988; Blau & Tekin, 2007; Tekin, 2005; . As a result, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) reorganized the patchwork child care subsidy system. In particular, Congress consolidated several preexisting subsidy programs into a single block grant, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). Federal and state expenditures for child care assistance were increased substantially, and individual states were given greater flexibility in program design and administration. In 2005, states spent approximately $9.4 billion on child care subsidies and served 1.7 million children in an average month (Child Care Bureau, 2005a) .
A sizable body of research examines the impact of child care subsidy receipt on mothers' employment and child care decisions (e.g., Meyers, Heintze, & Wolf, 2002; Tekin, 2005; Blau & Tekin, 2007) . Findings from these studies indicate that subsidies are effective in moving single mothers into paid employment and shifting children from informal child care settings into the formal market. However, researchers have neglected the question of whether child care subsidies have implications for child development. The relevance of this issue is clear, given that expenditures and the number of children served through the CCDF exceed other early childhood intervention programs.
2 Furthermore, research shows that developmental experiences during the first few years of a child's life have lasting effects on cognitive and behavioral well-being (Heckman & Materov, 2004; Lynch, 2004) .
Since most child care subsidies are used to purchase center-based care, which has been found to promote child development in some studies, it is commonly assumed that subsidies should also have positive effects on well-being. However, it is unclear a priori whether subsidies are beneficial or detrimental to child outcomes. There are three primary channels through which child care assistance policies can influence child outcomes. First, mothers must be employed to be eligible for a subsidy, and recent evidence suggests that early maternal employment is negatively associated with child development (Bernal, 2008; Brooks-Gunn, Han, & Waldfogel, 2002; James-Burdummy, 2005; Liu, Mroz, & Van der Klaauw, 2003; Ruhm, 2004) . Second, subsidies create strong incentives to purchase nonparental child care. The evidence here is mixed, with some studies finding positive effects of child care attendance (Loeb et al., 2004; NICHD, 2003a; 2003b) and others finding insignificant or negative effects (Baydar & Brooks-Gunn, 1991; Bernal & Keane, 2008; Blau, 1999; Desai, Chase-Lansdale, & Robert, 1989) . There is more agreement, however, that high-quality center-based care has positive effects on cognitive development, particularly for low-income children (NICHD & Duncan, 2003; Hill, Waldfogel, & Brooks-Gunn, 2002; Peisner-Feinberg et al., 2001) . Finally, child care subsidies free up income for parents to spend on private consumption and goods that enhance child quality. The extent to which additional income is spent on private consumption versus child quality depends on the relative size of the income elasticities This relationship is further complicated by the presence of several design features embedded in the CCDF that have implications for child care quality. Generally speaking, the explicit aim of subsidy policy is to support employment, not to support quality enhancements by providers (Blau, 2001; Gormley, 2007) . Arguably the most important design feature is the principle of "parental choice," in which parents are free to use subsidies to purchase virtually any legally-operating child care provider, including those operating outside states' regulatory regimes. Furthermore, conditioning eligibility for subsidies on employment and income creates challenges for maintaining stable child care arrangements. In particular, if changes in employment and income status are related to lapses in subsidy receipt, such instability could undermine child well-being by severing productive child-teacher-relationships and exposing children to comparatively low-quality care during unsubsidized periods. States' reimbursement rates-or the maximum amount a state agency pays a given provider-can also influence quality. If reimbursements are below the federally recommended level, families will not have access to high-quality care, and providers will not have incentives to make important quality enhancements.
This paper represents the first attempt to study the implications of child care subsidy receipt for child development in the United States. Our analyses draw on the Kindergarten cohort of the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS-K) to examine a wide range of child outcomes, including cognitive, behavioral, and psychomotor well-being. Our results indicate that child care subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten leads to negative child outcomes at kindergarten entry. For example, our best estimates suggest that children who receive subsidies score 0.29 and 0.25 standard deviations lower on tests of reading and math ability, respectively. These negative effects generally apply to several outcomes in the behavioral domain. Furthermore, the impact of subsidies persists until the end of kindergarten. While the data do not permit a detailed analysis of the mechanisms through which child care subsidies are detrimental to child development, we present descriptive evidence from the ECLS-K and discuss results from other studies that both point to poor child care quality as a possible explanation for the negative subsidy effects. Implications of our findings are important because they suggest that the current child care subsidy system-with its overemphasis on employment-may undermine the development of children whose parents depend on this form of assistance.
II.
Overview of Child Care Subsidy Policy and Previous Research on Child Care
The CCDF and Implications for Child Care Quality
To be eligible for CCDF funds, families must be engaged in a state-defined acceptable work activity (e.g., employment, education, or job training), have incomes below 85 percent of the state median income (SMI), and have at least one child ages 0 to 12. States are given substantial flexibility in designing their subsidy systems, including the ability to transfer up to 30 percent of their TANF block grant to the CCDF, setting reimbursement and co-payment rates, and defining acceptable work activities. However, states must spend no less than four percent of their CCDF allocation on quality improvement activities, and a market rate survey must be conducted every two years to ensure that subsidy families have "equal access" to high-quality providers.
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As previously stated, there are several design features associated with the CCDF that have
implications for the quality of child care purchased with subsidies. The most important feature is the principle of "parental choice," in which parents are free to use subsidies to pay for any legallyoperating child care provider, including unregulated relatives and other in-home caregivers. 4 To receive federal funds, providers are only required to be licensed if there is a state mandate, or they must meet basic health and safety regulations in cases where the state grants legal exemptions from licensing. The increased flexibility through "parental choice" is beneficial for working parents, but allowing providers to accept subsidized children while operating outside states' regulatory regime means that some children are exposed to low-quality care that is difficult to monitor (Adams, Tout, & Zaslow, 2007) . Mandating only minimum quality standards also reduces the incentive for providers to invest in costly quality improvements that support child development.
3 Results from the survey are used to set reimbursements at a level that allows subsidized families to purchase child care up to the 75 th percentile of the local price distribution. 4 Indeed, fully 25 percent of subsidized children participate in unregulated daycare settings (Child Care Bureau, 2005b) .
5
The CCDF's emphasis on supporting employment may also influence the stability and quality of care received by low-income children. As noted above, parental eligibility for subsidies is conditioned on employment and income, which means that parents lose eligibility if they become separated from a job, have earnings that exceed the threshold, or fail to comply with states' recertification rules. These eligibility rules can be at odds with children's developmental needs.
Recent evidence suggests that the median subsidy spell lasts only three to seven months . If lapses in subsidy receipt prompt frequent changes in child care arrangements when parents lose eligibility, such instability could have negative effects on child outcomes (Loeb et al., 2004; Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000; Tran & Weinraub, 2006) .
Linking subsidy eligibility to employment and income also creates challenges for providers to increase quality. Child care providers that rely heavily on subsidized children as a source of revenue may experience severe fiscal shortfalls when parents lose eligibility or use their subsidy to pay another provider. States' use of rationing, waiting lists, and other tools to navigate the CCDF funding structure can be a further source of financial instability for child care providers. Given the volatility associated with serving large numbers of subsidized children, providers have few incentives to make substantial quality improvements, especially those requiring a long-term commitment of sustained funding (e.g., higher wages, additional and high-skilled staff, and educational materials) (Adams & Rohacek, 2002) .
Finally, states' CCDF regimes influence child care quality through reimbursement rates.
Child care subsidies increase purchasing power by enabling low-income parents to afford a level of quality provided in the larger child care market. 5 The CCDF attempts to surmount the problem of low average quality by setting reimbursement rates at a level high enough to cover at least 75 percent of the prices charged in the local child care market. Setting reimbursement rates at the 75 th percentile is a federal recommendation, however, leaving states with substantial flexibility to set lower benefit levels. As of 2007, only nine states established reimbursement rates at the 75 th percentile of the local price distribution, compared to 22 states in 2001 (Schulman & Blank, 2007) . Low reimbursement rates limit parental access to high-quality providers, thereby decreasing demand for such services and weakening incentives for providers to raise quality.
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Previous Research
The only other study to consider explicitly the role of child care subsidies in determining child outcomes is Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) . The authors analyze the impact of Quebec's "$5 per day child care" program on child care utilization, labor supply, and child and parent outcomes. Their results show that, although this highly-subsidized child care program dramatically increased parental labor supply, it also had large, negative effects on children and parents. In particular, children were worse off in a variety of behavioral and health dimensions, ranging from increased physical aggression and diminished social skills to increases in common illnesses. The authors also find that the program led to more hostile and less consistent parenting, worse parental health, and lower-quality parental relationships. Our study differs from Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) in a number of ways. First, we use data on sample of U.S. children. Second, the U.S. subsidy system is different from the one examined in Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) . The subsidies offered in Quebec are available for working and non-working parents, while the U.S. system is targeted at working parents. In addition, the Quebec program is a universal entitlement, and child care subsidies in the U.S. are means-tested. Finally, Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) investigate child and parent outcomes for a sample of two-parent families, while we focus on children living with single mothers.
Although the literature on the effect of child care subsidies on child development is limited, there is a large number of studies examining the impact of child care utilization on children's intellectual and social development (Baydar & Brooks-Gunn, 1991; Bernal & Keane, 2008; Blau, 1999; Desai, Chase-Lansdale, & Robert, 1989; Hill, Waldfogel, & Brooks-Gunn, 2002; Loeb et al., 2004; NICHD, 2003a; 2003b; 2000a; 2000b; NICHD & Duncan, 2003; Peisner-Feinberg et al., 2001) . 7 This body of work is relevant to our research because mothers respond to child care subsidies by moving children away from parent and relative care and into formal arrangements.
Whether this substitution influences child outcomes positively or negatively depends on the relative productivity of parental care. Formal child care many improve child well-being if these arrangements place children in safer and more stimulating environments. However, significant time in these arrangements could lead to lower-quality mother-child interactions and less responsiveness of children to maternal sensitivity.
Overall, these studies produce inconclusive results on the impact of center-based care on cognitive outcomes. The diversity of findings is due, in part, to identification problems stemming from the treatment of child care choices as exogenous. A recent study by Bernal and Keane (2008) , however, addresses some of these self-selection issues by using welfare and other social policy reforms as instruments for a measure of child care time. Using a sample of single mothers in the NLSY, the authors find that an additional year of child care attendance reduces cognitive ability test scores by 2.1 percent, or approximately 0.11 standard deviations. Previous studies on social and emotional development generally find that children attending center-based care display more behavior problems and less self-control than children in other settings (NICHD, 2003b) . When studies are able to discern levels of child care quality, the results consistently suggest that children attending high-quality center-based care perform better on cognitive tests than children in family homes or relative care. Moreover, the cognitive benefits of high-quality care are greater among 7 See Smolensky and Gootman (2003) for a thorough review of this research.
8 children from disadvantaged backgrounds, a finding echoed by several random assignment studies evaluating states' welfare-to-work programs Gennetian et al., 2005) as well recent work on state pre-kindergarten programs (Gormley & Gayer, 2005; Magnuson, Ruhm, & Waldfogel, 2007) .
A final strand of empirical work that is relevant to the current study focuses on the impact of early maternal employment on child development (Baum, 2002; Bernal, 2008; Blau & Grossberg, 1992; Brooks-Gunn, Han, & Waldfogel, 2002; Desai, Chase-Lansdale and Michael, 1989; JamesBurdummy, 2005; Liu, Mroz, & Van der Klaauw, 2003; Ruhm, 2004; Waldfogel, Han, & BrooksGunn, 2002) . Similar identification problems plague many of the studies in this literature. However, a recent convergence of evidence finds that maternal work during the first three years of a child's life is associated with small, negative effects on children's cognitive ability. Some of these negative effects persist until children reach kindergarten, but a general conclusion in the literature is that they attenuate over time, and are even offset by small, positive effects of later maternal employment.
III. Data Sources
The data used in the analysis are drawn from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten cohort (ECLS-K), a nationally representative sample of 21,260 children attending kindergarten in the fall of 1998. 8 Children in the ECLS-K are followed through the eighth grade, with detailed parent, child, and teacher interviews conducted in the fall and spring of kindergarten (1998 and 1999) The ECLS-K provides researchers with a rich set of information on children's early academic preparation and behavior patterns, child care and pre-kindergarten attendance, as well as detailed data on the home and school environments.
Analyses in this study are based on the fall and spring of kindergarten waves of data collection, in which child cognitive and behavioral assessments were conducted and parents were asked questions about child care attendance in the year prior to kindergarten entry. We limit our sample to 2,795 children who lived with a single mother as of the fall of kindergarten interview.
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We focus on single mothers because they constitute a majority of eligible subsidy recipients.
According to Herbst (2008a) 
Child Outcomes
We explore a large set of child outcomes, broadly organized around cognitive, behavioral, and psychomotor categories. In the cognitive domain, reading and math tests were administered to parent interviews. Completion rates (or response rates that are conditioned on earlier stages of data collection) for the fall of kindergarten interviews were high: 89.9 percent of child assessments were completed, 85.3 percent of parent interviews were completed, and over 90 percent of the teacher interviews were completed. 10 Single mothers were identified in the ECLS-K by using the variable P1HPARNT, which describes the child's living arrangements. We defined single mother families as those in which the child lived with the "biological mother only." 11 Additional minor exclusions from the sample were made due to missing zip code identifiers, an inability to match children to the 2000 Census geocoded data, and mothers under age 19. A number of researchers drop children who were not first-time kindergarteners. However, we decided to retain these children and add a control for their presence in all models. In any case, they comprise a small number of the total analysis sample (147 In the behavioral domain, we explore teachers' subjective reports of children's internalizing behavior problems, externalizing behavior problems, approaches to learning, self-control, and interpersonal behavior. 13 The Internalizing Behavior Scale asks about the frequency with which children display anxiety, loneliness, low self-esteem, and sadness (four items). The Externalizing
Behavior Scale inquires about the frequency of acting out behaviors, including arguing, fighting, anger, and impulsive behavior (five items). The Approaches to Learning Scale measures behavior reflecting the ease children display in the learning environment, including attentiveness, task persistence, and eagerness to learn (six items). The Self-Control Scale measures the extent to which children are capable of controlling behavior by respecting the property of others, limiting temper, and responding appropriately to peer-pressure (four items). Finally, the Interpersonal Skills Scale provides information on children's ability to form and maintain friendships, comfort or help others, and show sensitivity toward one's peers (five items). All of the behavioral outcomes are measured 
Measures of Child Care Subsidy Receipt and Child Care Arrangements
The key independent variable in our analysis is a dummy variable indicating whether a child received subsidized, non-parental child care in the year prior to kindergarten. Parents are asked a series of questions about child care use during the past 12 months, including the number of arrangements, the amount of time (i.e., months, days, and hours) that each arrangement was used,
whether there was a cost associated with each arrangement, and if so, the amount paid for care.
Regarding subsidy receipt, parents were asked the following: "Did any of the following people or organizations help to pay for this … provider to care for {CHILD} the year before {he/she} started kindergarten?" Four possible choices were then presented to parents, and we coded those answering "a social service agency or welfare office" as receiving a child care subsidy. Similar questions appear in several nationally representative surveys (e.g., National Survey of America's Families and the Survey of Income and Program Participation), and other researchers have constructed indicators of subsidy receipt based on them (Blau and Tekin, 2007; Herbst, 2008a; Tekin, 2007) . The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (1999) finds that between 12 percent and 15 percent of eligible families received a CCDF subsidy in 1998. In our ECLS-K sample, 14.8 percent of children are coded as receiving subsidized care during the same period, further increasing our confidence in the measure.
14 We also create mutually exclusive groupings of child care arrangements. Specifically, we code children as having attended relative care (which includes caregiving inside and outside the child's home), non-relative care (nanny, babysitter, or family-based), center-based care (daycare center), or school-based services (prekindergarten, preschool, and nursery school). Children who did not attend any of these services are coded as receiving exclusively parent care. A non-trivial number of children received child care from more than one provider, so we create a decision rule to ensure mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.
15
Participation rates in the various child care arrangements are as follows: 14.6 percent of children received no non-parental care (parent care only); 22 percent received care from a relative; 7.2 percent received care from a non-relative; 16.3 percent participated in center-based care; and 39.9 percent participated in a school-based program.
Child and Family Characteristics, Contextual Factors, and the Policy Context
We exploit the richness of the ECLS-K to control for a detailed vector of child and family characteristics as of the fall of kindergarten. Key child characteristics include age, race, and birth weight. Parental time and skill inputs are captured by mother's age, lagged maternal employment, mother's and father's educational attainment, and parent's educational expectations for the child.
Parental resources and other goods inputs are represented by WIC and food stamps participation, total household income, and the number of books and audio CDs/tapes available in the home.
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Finally, all models control for a number of child and family background characteristics. These include indicators of early and current child health as well as developmental setbacks, specifically, whether the child was born prematurely, the child's current weight, whether the child repeated kindergarten, and the presence of disabilities. 17 This vector also contains family attributes that indirectly proxy time inputs and other resources, such as the age of the mother as of the first birth, the number of siblings in the household, and region of residence.
Although the ECLS-K asks parents a number of questions about subjective neighborhood quality, we control for contextual determinants of child outcomes by appending zip code-level
Census data to our main data file. These variables are derived from the 2000 Decennial Census' long form, and are obtained by researchers through a restricted use data agreement. We incorporate 12
variables at the zip code-level into our analyses, including median household income, population density, the fraction of households receiving public assistance, racial and ethnic composition, percent foreign born, female employment rates, and educational attainment. 16 We also experimented with a more extensive variable list, including a composite measure of socioeconomic status, which was constructed by ECLS-K staff and comprises parental education, occupation, and family income. This was ultimately excluded from the analysis, given that we include most of its constituent parts in the analysis. Our results are not sensitive to this exclusion. Furthermore, we experimented with a number of parent-child activities, such as frequency of reading, storytelling, playing games and sports, and participating in nature activities. Another cluster of potential variables included the extent to which parents thought it was important to have certain skills (e.g., counting and knowing letters) at the time of kindergarten entry. Finally, we considered additional family context variables, such as whether the child moved at all since birth and whether the current home location was chosen because of the school system. These variables are inconsistently associated with the outcomes, and removing them did not alter the results. 17 We define disability status using an ECLS-K composite variable. It includes individual questions on whether the child ever received any form of therapy before kindergarten, or had a learning, activity, mobility, speech, hearing, or vision problem diagnosed by a professional.
14 A final set of variables included in our analysis attempts to capture the state-level social policy environment in which children are raised and which have implications for single mothers' employment decisions. Although the ECSL-K provides information on early and current child care experiences, data covering maternal employment is incomplete. Therefore, we use a number of welfare and other social policy reforms implemented throughout the 1990s to account for unobserved work preferences that may be correlated with child outcomes. 18 Furthermore, these policy reforms should capture heterogeneity in state resources and attitudes influencing child development. These variables include the maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of three, the combined federal/state EITC maximum credit, a dummy variable for whether a state has a lifetime time limit on welfare receipt, the number of months for states' time limits, a dummy variable for whether a state has an immediate work requirement, child age exemption from work requirements, a dummy for whether a state has a full family welfare sanction for the first instance of non-compliance with work requirements, and a dummy variable for whether a state operates a formal cash diversion program, and state pre-kindergarten spending per child ages 0 to 4.
IV. Conceptual Framework and Econometric Model
Our goal is to examine the relationship between child care subsidy receipt and children's cognitive, behavioral, and psychomotor outcomes at the start of kindergarten. These outcomes are determined by a child development production function whose inputs include purchased goods (e.g., food, books, medical care, etc.), the quality of non-parental child care, and the market and nonmarket time of parents. Economists have estimated variations of this production function to examine the impact of pre-kindergarten (Magnusson et al. 2007) , child care inputs (Blau 1999) , child care use and income (Bernal & Keane, 2008) , and parental employment (Ruhm, 2004 ) on various measures of child well-being.
Rather than entering into the production function as a direct input, child care subsidies are assumed to influence child outcomes indirectly by affecting the mix of inputs toward purchased goods, non-parental child care, and the time allocation of parents. This is a plausible assumption because child care subsidies are essentially an in-kind benefit that enters parents' optimization problem through the budget and time constraints. In this framework, a decrease in the price of child care is predicted to raise the likelihood that a parent will work and use paid child care by increasing the effective wage rate and making formal care relatively cheaper (Blau & Currie, 2004; Blau & Robins, 1988; 1991; Kimmel, 1998; Tekin, 2007) . A child care subsidy therefore encourages parents to enter the paid labor force because it lowers the price of care.
As previously stated, a child care subsidy can influence child outcomes through several mechanisms. First, the income available for private consumption and purchasing goods to enhance child quality increases when families receive a subsidy. This is due to the positive effect of subsidies on employment, and the fact that these benefits release money that can be directed toward purchases other than child care. It is straightforward to show that the effect of an in-kind service is equivalent to a pure income transfer, in that it causes a parallel and outward shift in the budget constraint.
Parents will therefore respond by increasing both private consumption and purchases for childquality-enhancing goods and services. 19 The extent to which increases in disposable income is spent on private consumption as opposed to child quality depends on the relative size of the income elasticities.
Second, child care subsidies reduce the amount of time children spend with their parents, while increasing the amount of time in nonparental child care. Although increased spending on quality enhancing goods is predicted to be beneficial for child development, the impact of reduced maternal time depends on the relative quality of maternal versus nonparental child care. Evidence on the effect of maternal employment and child care is inconclusive. However, a key determinant of this relative productivity is the way in which the CCDF influences access to high-quality providers.
As the previous section makes clear, there are several design features associated with the CCDF that raise concerns about the level of child care quality received by subsidized children. Overall, it is unclear a priori whether subsidies are beneficial or detrimental to child development, and so this is ultimately an empirical question.
By substituting subsidy receipt into the non-market time of parents and non-parental child care quality, we can represent child outcomes as a function of child care subsidy receipt. Thus, our goal is to obtain reduced form parameters of the relationship between child outcomes and subsidy receipt. We start with an econometric model as follows:
where Y i is one of nine measures of child development taken for child i in the fall and spring of kindergarten; S i is an indicator for child care subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten; X i is a vector of exogenous determinants of child outcomes; and ε i is a disturbance term. Note that α is an estimate of the net effect of child care subsidies on child development. It represents the combined effect that takes place through parents' altered time and budget constraints, as well as supply-side limitations on the ability to purchase quality care, both of which are predicted to have implications for child development.
Estimating equation (1) with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will yield a biased estimate of α if the unobserved determinants of child outcomes are correlated with child care subsidy receipt.
For example, mothers who seek and obtain a subsidy (as well as those who work and use nonparental child care) may be systematically different from those who do not in ways that are not observed by researchers. If high-skilled mothers are more likely to work and have high-skilled children, then failing to control for maternal productivity would lead to an upward bias of α. Another selection mechanism deals with the possibility that mothers take children's cognitive ability, temperament, and economic circumstances into consideration when deciding whether to work and obtain a child care subsidy. If mothers differentially select work and child care choices based on unobserved child characteristics, the coefficient on subsidy receipt, α, will once again be biased.
We take a number of steps to guard against bias from unobserved heterogeneity. First, we exploit the richness of the ECLS-K data to control for an extensive set of child and family characteristics. Second, we incorporate detailed zip code-level and state social policy controls into the model. The purpose of these variables is to account for environmental and policy determinants of preferences for employment and child care that may influence child outcomes. Finally, we estimate models using Two-Stage Least Squares (2-SLS). To implement this approach, we rely on exclusion restrictions to identify the subsidy coefficient, α, in equation (1). Specifically, we need at least one instrument that is correlated with child care subsidy receipt, but uncorrelated with child outcomes.
We use variables that determine how subsidies are rationed by state and local administrators under the assumption that child outcomes are orthogonal to the rationing mechanism, conditional on subsidy receipt status. Furthermore, we assume that rationing is determined at the county level and therefore use county dummies as identifying instruments (Blau & Tekin, 2007) . There is evidence that local program administrators have substantial autonomy to determine the mix of low-income families that are given subsidies (Layzer & Collins, 2000; Blank et al., 2001; Micthell et al., 1997) .
This identification strategy will be invalid if the county dummies cannot be appropriately excluded from equation (1). For example, state and local government policies may influence child outcomes through channels that are outside the child care subsidy system. If states and localities with generous subsidy benefits are also more likely to offer pre-kindergarten programs and other child-related benefits, then our identification strategy will be invalid if these programs are not accounted for in the estimation. In order to guard against this possibility, we include in some models 18 21 zip code-level and state policy variables that proxy the ability and determination of state and local governments to influence child outcomes. children perform worse than their counterparts in every domain, and most of these differences persist to the spring of kindergarten. In fact, tests of the null hypothesis of no difference between subsidy recipients and non-recipients are rejected for six of nine outcomes in the fall of kindergarten and six of seven outcomes in the spring of kindergarten. One should interpret these results with caution, as they do not adjust for any differences between subsidy recipients and non-recipients. Some of these poorer outcomes could reflect the possibility that subsidized children come from socially and economically disadvantaged backgrounds, an issue we explore next. A final piece of descriptive evidence points to a reasonable amount of observational equivalence between subsidy recipients and non-recipients. The ECLS-K produces an index of socioeconomic status (SES), which combines mother's and father's education, mother's and father's occupational status, and total family income. According to this measure, subsidized and unsubsidized families are equally represented in every SES quintile but the top one. Even here, however, the difference is not quantitatively large (five percent versus 11 percent).
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V. Empirical Results
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In sum, although it appears that subsidized children are drawn from disadvantaged social and economic backgrounds, they are not disproportionately represented in the lowest SES quintiles. This is not surprising, given that the process of navigating the subsidy system probably requires substantial motivation and skill. Moreover, that the observable characteristics of subsidized families indicate that they are not negatively selected is interesting in light of the raw outcome differences between subsidized and unsubsidized children. Such a pattern is an initial piece of evidence that mechanisms outside the family context could be responsible for the poorer outcomes of subsidized children.
Results from OLS regressions of the fall of kindergarten child outcomes on child care subsidy receipt are presented in Table 3 . Column (1) shows the subsidy coefficient for separate regressions that control for the child and family characteristics presented in Table 2 . 21 Column (2) adds the state-level policy variables that are assumed to influence child outcomes, while column (3) incorporates the zip code-level variables that further account for local policy and attitudinal differences affecting child development.
As shown in Table 3 , many of the differences in child outcomes between subsidy recipients and non-recipients disappear once the observable characteristics of children and families are added to the model. Specifically, differences in reading test scores, approaches to learning, self-control, interpersonal skills, and gross motor skills between subsidized and unsubsidized children are rendered statistically insignificant in column (1). Subsidy receipt, however, continues to be associated with increases in externalizing behavior problems, with the coefficient indicating that subsidies increase the frequency of such behavior by 0.1 standard deviations. With the exception of self-control, adding the state policy and zip code-level controls does not alter the results. As shown in column (2) and (3), the coefficient on subsidy receipt becomes statistically significant in the selfcontrol model, once again implying that subsidized children display more behavior problems. The 21 The only variables omitted from Table 2 are the indicators of child care participation.
magnitude of the subsidy coefficient in the externalizing behavior model is unchanged, and continues to be statistically significant at conventional levels.
Results from the fall 2-SLS models are presented in Appendix (Blau & Tekin, 2007; Herbst, 2008a; Meyers, Heintze, & Wolf, 2002) . Black children and those with multiple siblings are more likely to receive a subsidy. Mother's education is positively correlated with the likelihood of subsidy receipt, which is consistent with the story that considerable knowledge and skill may be necessary to navigate the application process and deal with local government agencies. Early maternal employment is a positive predictor of subsidy receipt, reflecting the fact that CCDF child care subsidies are tied to participation in work-related activities. Finally, families receiving WIC and food stamps are more likely to obtain subsidies. That the likelihood of subsidy receipt is greater among employed mothers and those with some attachment to other means-tested programs has been documented elsewhere (Herbst, 2008a) . To evaluate the strength of the identifying instruments, we calculate the partial R 2 and conduct an F-test for the joint significance of the county dummies. The R 2 increases by 0.09 when the county dummies are added to the model, and the F-test yields a highly significant 24.33, more than twice the guideline suggested by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) pre-kindergarten attendance among ECLS-K children. Thus, it appears that the absolute value of our subsidy estimates is similar to those from other early childhood intervention programs.
Specification Checks
The results discussed so far indicate a relationship between child care subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten and child outcomes measured during the fall of kindergarten. In order to test the robustness of our findings and to assess whether these effects persist beyond the fall of kindergarten, we re-estimate our models using child outcomes measured during the spring of kindergarten interview. Results from these models are presented in column (1) and (3) of Table 5 .
Column (1) displays the subsidy coefficients from the OLS models, and column (3) displays the subsidy coefficients from the 2-SLS models. Note that we estimate these models using the specification that includes the zip code-level and state policy variables. As illustrated in column (1), the OLS coefficients are largely consistent with those in Table 3 . There is a negative and statistically significant effect of subsidy receipt on self-control. The remaining coefficients are not estimated with much precision. While the OLS results do not point to a consistent pattern, the 2-SLS estimates presented in column (3) clearly suggest a negative effect of subsidy receipt that persists to the end of kindergarten. The coefficients on reading test scores, math test scores, and self-control are negative and significant, indicating that subsidy receipt reduces cognitive ability and increases behavior problems. The coefficients on approaches to learning and interpersonal skills are negative, again suggesting that subsidies are associated with worse behavioral outcomes, although neither coefficient is estimated precisely. Only the estimates for internalizing and externalizing behavior point to a positive effect of subsidy receipt, but neither is statistically significant.
As a final attempt to guard against bias from unobserved heterogeneity, we take advantage of the fact that child outcomes in the ECLS-K are measured during multiple interviews. This allows us to estimate models with lagged dependent variables, which further account for unobservables that are correlated with child care subsidy receipt and child outcomes (Blau & Tekin, 2007) . 22 To implement 22 Conceptually, these models can be derived from a specification which posits that current child development (Y it ) is determined by subsidy receipt in all the previous periods, beginning with the most recent one. That is,
Note that if λ<1, then the influence of subsidy receipt on child development becomes smaller as one goes back further into the past. Multiplying (2) by λ and lagging by one period results in:
Subtracting (2B) from (2A) and re-arranging the terms yields
where π = µ(1 -λ) and ω it =(ε it -λ ε it-1 ). We augment (3) by adding the controls in (1) to estimate the following equation:
this approach, we estimate OLS and 2-SLS regressions of spring of kindergarten child outcomes on subsidy receipt, the full set of exogenous controls, and the appropriate lagged dependent variable (fall of kindergarten child outcome). Subsidy coefficients from these models are displayed column (2) and (4) of Table 5 . Most of the OLS estimates, in column (2), point to a negative effect of subsidy receipt, although only the coefficient in the self-control model is statistically significant. The 2-SLS estimates, in column (4), also point to consistent negative effects. In particular, we find that subsidy recipients score 1.6 points lower than non-recipients on the reading test and 2.9 points lower on the math test, translating to effect sizes of 0.16 and 0.29, respectively. While most of the subsidy coefficients continue to point to negative effects in the behavioral domain, none of the estimates are measured precisely.
Interpretation of Empirical Results
By accounting for the endogeneity of child care subsidy receipt, we mitigate the influence of unobserved child and family characteristics that are correlated with measures of child well-being. An important question is why subsidies continue to influence child outcomes even after removing systematic differences between subsidized and unsubsidized children. In this section, we elaborate further on the mechanisms through which subsidies might have detrimental effects on children. The thrust of our discussion focuses on the stability and intensity of child care use during the period ECLS-K children received subsidized care (i.e., the year prior to kindergarten entry). We then turn our attention to summarizing previous research on overall child care quality in the U.S., as well as studies comparing quality across subsidized and unsubsidized children.
As previously stated, conditioning eligibility for child care subsidies on employment and income can be at odds with child development if lapses in eligibility lead to unstable child care
arrangements. 23 Indeed, studies show that children participating in multiple arrangements have difficulties adjusting to new environments and developing trusting relationships with teachers and peers (Bacharach & Baumeister, 2003; Crockenberg & Litman, 1991; Youngblade, 2003) . Such concerns are heightened given that the median subsidy spell lasts only three to seven months . Furthermore, by increasing purchasing power, child care subsidies create incentives to buy more child care in the formal market. If the quality of care purchased with subsidies is poor, then subsidies might lead to a situation in which subsidized children are exposed to risky environments for longer periods.
Using the ECLS-K, we examine whether subsidized and unsubsidized children differ according to the intensity and stability of nonparental arrangements. Results from this exercise are presented in Table 6 . The top panel of Table 6 provides an overview of child care use in the years prior to subsidy receipt. Specifically, it shows the fraction of recipients and non-recipients beginning their first nonparental arrangement at a given age. It appears that the patterns of early child care use are similar for both groups of children. For example, about equal proportions of subsidized and unsubsidized children first participated in nonparental care before age one (46 percent versus 43 percent). A significantly greater fraction of recipients started care at age one, but the percentages are identical at each starting-age thereafter.
The story changes dramatically, however, for child care use in the year of subsidy receipt (bottom panel of Table 6 ). In particular, subsidized children participate in nonparental care more intensively than non-recipients. Recipients are more likely to use a nonparental arrangement at least five times per week (82 percent versus 75 percent), and are more likely to be in care at least 40 hours per week (42 percent versus 35 percent). In addition, we find evidence that subsidized children 23 Recent work by Adams, Snyder, and Sandfort (2002) highlight many challenges faced by parents in retaining access to child care subsidies. For example, states' recertification process, which occurs at regular intervals (usually every six or 12 months), is a way for agencies to check employment and income eligibility status. However, a failure to recertify can leave families ineligible for subsidies. Furthermore, states require parents to notify agencies if there is a change in employment status, including a job loss or a change in hours worked. Some states offer a brief window of continued access to subsidies if parents lose their job (to facilitate a job search), but others move quickly to eliminate eligibility.
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receive less stable child care: a significantly greater share of subsidy recipients participates in multiple arrangements (57 percent versus 41 percent). Taken together, these data suggest that differential patterns of child care use emerge after children receive a subsidy. Subsidy recipients participate in nonparental care child environments more intensively, but at the same time, these arrangements tend to be more unstable. Of course, greater intensity of child care use cannot by itself explain the poorer outcomes among subsidized children; the impact of exposure depends crucially on the quality of care. However, the ECLS-K data do not permit detailed comparisons of child care
quality, so we turn to the literature to provide insights.
Recent empirical work finds that average child care quality in the U.S. is rated "minimal" or "good" according to structural (e.g., child-to-staff ratio, group size, and conformity with health and safety standards) and process (e.g., caregiver interactions and cognitive/language stimulation) measures of child care environments (Helburn et al., 1995; Mocan, 1997; NICHD, 2000a) . Studies by the NICHD Early Child Care Research Network Although overall child care quality has been rated "good" at best, it is important for the purposes of this paper to discuss differences in purchased quality across low-and highincome families and subsidized and unsubsidized families. Studies comparing child care use across income groups find inconsistent differences in the quality of center-based care, with some research pointing to higher quality among low-income children (NICHD, 1997; Phillips et al., 1994) and others finding lower quality (Loeb et al., 2004; Marshall et al., 2001 ). Research by Dowsett et al. (2008) finds that structural measures of child care quality are about equal for low-and high-income children, but that poor children experience lower quality care across several process-oriented measures, including negative adult interactions and cognitive stimulation. The quality of family-based and relative care, however, is more consistently of lower quality among low-income children (Coley et al., 2001; Dowsett et al., 2008; Votruba-Drzal et al., 2004) .
A sizeable body of research compares purchased child care quality across subsidized and unsubsidized (low-income) children. Generally speaking, results from these studies imply that subsidized children receive lower-quality care ( for example, finds that subsidy density is negatively correlated with overall quality, as well as teacher salary and measures of cognitive stimulation (Jones-Branch et al., 2004) . Many of these quality differences are pronounced for children attending family-based care. A general finding in the literature is that subsidized providers are rated worse on both structural and process measures, especially caregiver education and sensitivity, staff turnover, and social interactions. Other researchers find that subsidized providers are also more likely to be out of compliance with state licensing standards (Queralt, Witte, & Greisinger, 2000; Thornburg et al., 2002) .
In sum, this discussion suggests that child care subsidies shift children into a formal market providing "minimal" or "good" quality services, with (unsubsidized) low-income and subsidized children experiencing even poorer-quality environments. These quality concerns cut across the range of formal child care options-including center-based care-but appear to be particularly applicable to family-based settings. Results from this body of work, in combination with the descriptive evidence presented in Table 6 , paint a tentative picture about the mechanisms through which the negative subsidy effects are operating.
Specifically, it is conceivable that subsidized children receive intense exposure to lowquality care through center-and family-based arrangements. Furthermore, given that subsidized children are more likely to participate in multiple arrangements, these quality deficits might grow larger as the number of child care settings increases. Our story for the role of child care quality is plausible in light our earlier finding that subsidized families are equally represented across most socioeconomic strata.
VI. Conclusions
In recent years, child care subsidies have become an important policy instrument to help lowincome parents move from welfare into the paid labor force. Given that the current subsidy system strictly ties benefits to participation in work-related activities, parents are able to use subsidies to purchase child care services from any legally-operating provider. However, there are few incentives or requirements within the CCDF that encourage parents and providers to make quality-enhancing investments. As a consequence, there are reasons to be concerned about the implications of child care subsidies for the well-being of children.
In this paper, we provide the first systematic assessment of the impact of the U.S. child care subsidy system on child development. Using a sample of ECLS-K children living with single mothers, we find consistent evidence that subsidies are associated with negative child development outcomes. In particular, our results suggest that subsidy receipt in the year before kindergarten 29 lowers reading and math test scores, decreases the eagerness to learn, and leads to more behavior problems in the fall of kindergarten. The negative subsidy effects for reading and math test scores persist to the spring of kindergarten, but many of the behavioral effects attenuate. Although far from definitive, we provide evidence that the intense exposure to low-quality child care could be responsible for the negative subsidy effects. This story seems plausible in light of the fact that subsidized families are no worse off economically than their unsubsidized counterparts.
Our investigation points to the necessity of aligning the employment goals established by recent social policy reforms with the goal of ensuring child health and well-being. One way to accomplish this is by decoupling the strong relationship between subsidy receipt and employment, or by giving parents and child care providers strong to incentives to make quality investments. Based on the results of this study, policy changes directed at increasing the continuity of subsidized care would be beneficial, as would establishing reimbursements at a level high enough to allow parents to choose among high-quality providers in the community. Furthermore, the recent experience with pre-kindergarten in the U.S. may provide additional guidance on how to integrate child development goals into the subsidy system.
There are several possible directions for future research in this area. First, it is critical that researchers understand the mechanisms through which child care subsidies influence child wellbeing. Although we put forth a plausible story about the role of child care quality, additional work needs to verify whether this is the case. Future work should also attempt to understand the role of maternal employment, given that previous studies tend to find a negative relationship between early maternal work and child development. Second, it is important to determine whether certain child care arrangements are responsible for the negative subsidy effects. It is clear that subsidy recipients are more likely to participate in center-and family-based child care, making these arrangements a reasonable place to begin an investigation. Finally, it is important to explore heterogeneity in the impact of child care subsidies. Given that previous research on child care finds a differential response depending on child and family characteristics, one may assume that such heterogeneity exists with respect to subsidies. Notes: All means are weighted using the ECLS-K Parent Full Sample weight. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Analyses are conducted on children with non-missing data. The number of subsidy recipients is 410 for the cognitive and behavioral outcomes, approaches to learning, and fine motor skills; 398 for self-control; 402 for interpersonal skills; 406 for gross motor skills. *, **, *** indicate that the difference in means for subsidy recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant at the 0.10 percent, 0.05 percent, and 0.01 percent levels, respectively. Notes: All means are weighted using the ECLS-K Parent Full Sample weight. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Analyses are conducted on children with non-missing data. *, **, *** indicate that the difference in means for subsidy recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant at the 0.10 percent, 0.05 percent, and 0.01 percent levels, respectively. Notes: Each cell represents the coefficient on child care subsidy receipt derived from an OLS regression of each child outcome on the subsidy dummy, the full set of child and family controls presented in Table 2 , and depending on the column, state policy controls and zip code-level controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include dummy variables that equal unity for the child care and family controls with missing data. Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight. Full results are available from the authors upon request. *, **, **** indicate that the subsidy coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Notes: Each cell represents the coefficient on child care subsidy receipt derived from a 2-SLS regression of each child outcome on the subsidy dummy, the full set of child and family controls presented in Table 2 , and depending on the column, state policy controls and zip code-level controls. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include dummy variables that equal unity for the child care and family controls with missing data. Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight. Full results are available from the authors upon request. *, **, **** indicate that the subsidy coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Notes: Each cell represents the coefficient on child care subsidy receipt derived from a 2-SLS regression of each child outcome on the subsidy dummy and the full set of child and family controls presented in Table 2 . All models include dummy variables that equal unity for the child care and family controls with missing data. Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight. Full results are available from the authors upon request. *, **, **** indicate that the subsidy coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Notes: Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight. Analyses are limited to children in nonparental child care arrangements (relative, non-relative, center-based, school-based, and Head Start) in the years prior to kindergarten entry. The percentages for children in multiple child care arrangements include children in Head Start. Center-based arrangements include daycare services, while school-based arrangements include pre-k, preschool, and nursery school. Non-relative care includes both in-home and out-of-home arrangements. *, **, *** indicate that the percentages for subsidy recipients and non-recipients are statistically significantly different at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Notes: Analyses are weighted using the ECLS-K Base Year Full Sample Parent Weight. Also included in the model are dummy variables that equal unity for each variable with missing data. Not shown here are the coefficients on the zip code, state policy, and county fixed effects, which are the identifying instruments. *, **, **** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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